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INTRODUCTION
“Access to justice” is a broad term that can be defined in different ways.
In this volume alone we find different contributions which present different
views of access to justice, and different answers to central normative questions concerning access to justice, such as how much access is appropriate,
access to what exactly or access by whom. The movement to increase
access to justice has likewise taken different directions, including the development of less formal forms of dispute resolution, simplification of legal
processes, and the progress of in-court assistance to unrepresented litigants.
Yet, traditionally, and for the most part, increasing access to justice has
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been related to increased access to legal counsel.1 Having access to representation by an attorney is considered a central means to increase individuals’ access to justice, i.e., access to legal institutions or to legal solutions to
their problems. The ABA’s current proposal to institutionalize a right to
counsel in certain civil cases continues this traditional movement. It offers
to deal with access problems by making legal services more accessible for
greater parts of society and by framing access to counsel as an entitlement
in more types of cases.
This paper is written as part of the discussion around the Bar’s proposal.2 This conversation, we believe, presents an important opportunity to
use empirical knowledge in order to revisit and explore anew some of the
basic assumptions and features of the American legal system—features that
are reflected in the proposal itself. In particular, we wish to focus on the
equation between access to counsel and access to justice and the realities
and difficulties faced by laypeople within the legal process.
The primary purpose of this paper is to explore a psychological perspective on some of the issues concerning access to justice in civil litigation.
This is an attempt to present what the existing literature, as well as additional suggested research, can and should teach us about the psychological
aspects of the access challenge in civil litigation and about the needs concerning the expansion of the right to counsel to civil cases. Hopefully, the
psychological point of view will enrich the discussion around the bar’s
proposal by focusing on the subjective experiences of represented and unrepresented litigants within the legal system. We will present a discussion
that is based on needs rather than rights, on the subjective perceptions of
individuals rather than objective, and normative evaluations concerning the
value of representation. We are interested in the way individuals perceive
the concept of “access”, and to what degree they actually feel they have
gained, or been denied, access to justice and under which specific circumstances. The values we will discuss are those procedural values that individuals identify with legal procedures that are fair and satisfactory. Public
views, we believe, are one factor that needs to be considered when thinking
about policy change.

1. For a detailed discussion of the different stages and waves of the Access to Justice
Movement, see Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, A World Survey, in 1 ACCESS TO JUST.,
21-54 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1978).
2. This paper was originally written for a presentation. Tom R. Tyler & Nourit Zimerman, Address at the ABA Symposium: Real People, Real Needs, Real Solutions—
Access to Legal Representation in Civil Litigation (Dec. 4-5, 2008). The symposium dealt
with the ABA’s proposal to establish and institutionalize a right to counsel, at public expense, to low income persons in certain categories of civil adversarial proceedings involving
basic human needs, such as issues of shelter, sustenance, safety, health, or child custody.
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The bar’s proposal is obviously an important step towards increasing
many individuals’ access to legal representation and to the courts. This is
particularly essential in view of the centrality of professionals in the American system—a centrality that disadvantages pro se litigants within the
court system. Yet, we will try to go beyond these obvious observations to
provide a thicker understanding of the mixed psychological values that are
attached to representation, direct participation or access to justice more
generally.
Looking into the pro se phenomenon, this paper will explore the lessons
that can be learned from the experiences of the many individuals
representing themselves in the American legal system today. These lessons
apply not only to the needs of this specific group (which is the target of the
bar’s reform), but may illustrate more generally the centrality of lawyers in
the American legal system, and how the advice of counsel, or lack thereof,
influences those operating within the court system.
Pragmatically speaking, looking at the bar’s proposal, it is the group that
is currently denied access to lawyers, but which would have them under the
proposed reform that is of the greatest interest here. We can ask how the
experiences and evaluations of this group would change if their access to
lawyers improved. The change might involve a greater likelihood that they
would bring their problems to court and also the possibility that, in court,
their experiences and outcomes would be different. For example, these experiences might be more positive because of the support of a professional
attorney or, the representation by an attorney might carry some psychological drawbacks since it requires one to give up on the opportunity for direct
participation.
Our interest in this paper will go beyond this specific group of selfrepresented litigants to try to understand better the procedural values that
matter to people and how they are related to having or not having professional legal representation. We would distinguish several questions: The
first is whether, and in what ways, having a lawyer or not having a lawyer
influences the experiences of lay people operating within the legal system,
their evaluations of the process and the system, and of the outcomes obtained by them. Reading the procedural justice literature we will ask how
representation, or the lack thereof, is related to the procedural aspects identified by individuals as fair and just.
The second question is whether, and to what degree, having or being denied access to counsel influences one’s decision to take a problem into
court (in cases in which a person might have either a legitimate legal claim
or a frivolous claim).
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The third question is whether feeling that one is denied access to a lawyer and/or to court due to the inability to have legal representation has an
influence upon non-lawyers. What are the consequences when people feel
that they are unable to obtain access to counsel? Do people who have
access to counsel necessarily use counsel, and how do people feel when
they have access to counsel but decide not to use it?
And finally, irrespective of why people do not have counsel, what can
we say about the pro se experience and what can we learn from the ways in
which non-lawyers and legal actors interact within the legal system.
In the first part of the paper we will present and discuss the legal background and legal challenges presented by the pro se phenomenon, the centrality of lawyers, and the connection between access to counsel and access
to justice in the American legal system. The second part is devoted to a review and analysis of the empirical work on the questions we presented
above. We then close with some conclusions drawn from the existing data
as well as a proposal for additional research.
I. BACKGROUND: UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN A LAWYERDOMINATED ENVIRONMENT
The American legal system relies heavily on the representation of litigants by lawyers in court procedures. Even more than other western legal
systems, the American system is lawyer-dominated.3 At the heart of its
procedures, it posits the lawyer,4 a professional trained to bring her client’s
voice and interests before the court. Within this legal scheme, lawyers
serve both litigants and the system. They serve the litigants by bringing legal expertise and case management experience to bear on a particular case.
They therefore provide a professional service that is believed to significantly increase the chances of winning in a system that treats dispute resolution
in an adversarial setting in which the best litigator wins.5 At the same time,

3. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 3 (First
Harvard University Press 2003) (2001).
4. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not assign the litigant a structured role in
the process. Generally speaking, it seems that the rules “tacitly posit the lawyer as central,”
Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedures in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494,
537 (1986), to a degree that they “often make litigants . . . invisible.” Judith Resnik, Revising the Canon: Feminist Help in Teaching Procedure, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1193
(1992). If we look back to the history of the Rules, it seems that the fundamental role lawyers played in the drafting process can explain, at least to some extent, the lawyer-centered
orientation of the rules. See Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedures in Decline, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 503-05 (1986).
5. For the ways in which having legal representation actually influences outcomes, an
issue we do not discuss here, see, in this volume: Russell Engler, Connecting Self-
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the work of lawyers serves the basic structure of the adversary system,6 allowing judges to preserve a passive role and sparing them the potential
complexities of dealing with unprofessional litigants who are not invested
in long-term relations with other legal actors that motivate people to adhere
to rules of appropriate conduct when dealing with legal authorities.
The American legal system ascribes great importance to the right of individuals to participate in legal procedures, and to have their “day in
court.”7 Yet, as lawyers develop a greater role in the system, the legal
process becomes more professionalized and complex and, when the procedural design assumes representation, the ability of individuals to actually
proceed successfully without an attorney, or to directly participate when
they do have an attorney, diminishes.
From here follows the equation between access to counsel and access to
justice: being represented by an attorney is considered a central requirement for meaningful access to the American justice system. Moreover, representation by a lawyer in itself has gradually been thought of as an essential aspect of due process rights and the right of participation in legal
procedures. As noted by the Supreme Court, “‘[t]he right to be heard
would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to
be heard by counsel.’”8 Therefore, while the ideal of participation in legal
proceedings can be interpreted and implemented in different ways,9 this po-

Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel is Most
Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 44-66 (2010); Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole Mott,
Research on Self-Represented Litigation: Preliminary Results and Methodological Considerations, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 163, 170-71 (2003).
6. MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 3 (1986).
7. The conventional understanding of having one’s “day in court” seems to be one of
personal participation. “Because the English and United States constitutional traditions initially made political commitments to due process within the framework of individual litigation, the relationship between process and individual participation was straightforward. The
rights to notice and to be heard belonged to an individual who had the opportunity to participate.” Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 358-59 (1996);
see also Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 204 (1992).
8. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 68-69 (1932)).
9. Participation in legal procedures can have different meanings and take different
forms. It can be direct participation that includes face-to-face interaction with the decisionmaker, or be mediated by a representative. It can be understood more or less broadly. The
scope and essence of participation will greatly depend on the different values and goals one
attributes to the legal process itself. See, e.g., Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech
and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L. REV. 705, 707-08 (2004). See generally Christine B.
Harrington, The Politics of Participation and Nonparticipation in Dispute Processes, 6 LAW
& POL’Y 203 (1984).
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sition reflects the way in which the traditional, and dominant, view ended
up interpreting it as being truly achieved only through representation by a
professional.
In reality though, despite the centrality of representation in the design of
legal processes, the cost of legal services today is such that many people
cannot afford to hire a lawyer.10 Responding to that reality, the proposal to
institutionalize a right to counsel in civil cases tries to improve the existing
structure by creating a level playing field where all litigants enjoy similar
professional assistance. Providing an attorney to people could bring more
individuals to the courts and improve the prospect of those individuals who
already turn to the courts representing themselves.
We find these individuals, in increasing numbers, proceeding pro se in
more and more courts and cases across the country. Indeed, pro se litigants
are becoming a more common phenomenon in American courts, especially
in the area of family law, and in “poor people courts” which deal with cases
such as traffic or landlord/tenant disputes, where the pro se litigant has actually become the norm.11
10. Most low-income and moderate-income individuals cannot afford the cost of counsel. An ABA legal needs study reports that nearly 71% of legal situations facing lowincome households in America do not find their way into the justice system. See JONA
GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., STATE JUSTICE INST., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS 10 11, n.26 (1998)
(citing ABA CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES AND THE PUBLIC, LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL
JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS – MAJOR FINDINGS FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL
NEEDS STUDY (1994)). In a study conducted in California in 2005, 69% of those interviewed indicated that attorney cost had or might prevent them from going to court. DAVID
ROTTMAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE CALIFORNIA
COURTS 2005: A SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC AND ATTORNEYS 19-20 available at http://www.
courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/4_37pubtrust1.pdf. See also Drew A. Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles: The Need to Curb Extreme Forms of Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1537, 1541-46 (2005).
11. Some numbers for example: a California report from 2004 found that 4.3 million
court users were self-represented in California. In family law cases, 67% of petitioners were
self-represented. In a study of domestic relation cases in Arizona, at least one of the parties
was pro se in almost 90% of the cases, and in 52% both parties were pro se. In other types
of civil cases the numbers are much lower, but still not negligible. A study from 1995 of
forty-five urban trial courts found that an average of 3% of all tort cases involved at least
one pro se litigant. In a Chicago study from 1994 pro se cases constituted 28% of all landlord-tenant cases. In 1995, 25% of all new civil suits were brought pro se. And the numbers seem to keep growing. For more data, see GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 10; JOHN
M. GREACEN, CTR. FOR FAMILIES, CHILDREN AND THE COURTS, SELF REPRESENTED LITIGANTS AND COURT AND LEGAL SERVICES RESPONSES TO THEIR NEEDS: WHAT WE KNOW
(2003), available at www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/pdffiles/SRLwhatweknow.pdf;
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, PRO SE STATISTICS (2006) available at http://www.
ncsconline.org/wc/publications/memos/prosestatsmemo/htm. On the growth of pro se litigation in divorce cases, see Lynn Mather, Changing Patterns of Legal Representation in Divorce: From Lawyers to Pro Se, 30 J. L. & SOC’Y 137, 142 (2003).
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Pro se litigants present a very interesting exception to what is still regarded as the paradigmatic case in court procedures—a dispute resolution
process that is dominated by professionals. Indeed, the encounter between
lay people and the legal system is challenging for both sides, and pro se litigants are usually perceived as a problem—both to the courts and to themselves. From the litigants’ side, there are the obvious difficulties of having
to manage within a highly professionalized system whose rules, language
and practices they do not know. There is the fear then that pro se litigants’
rights and interests are left unprotected.
From the courts’ side, pro se litigants are considered a burden; the need
to deal directly with litigants (rather than professionals) requires modifications in routine processes and court personnel to deviate from their traditional roles12 and provide additional assistance. Therefore, pro se litigants
are often attacked for clogging the courts and creating judicial inefficiencies.13 Various reports indicate that there are burdens presented by pro se
litigants, such as clerk time required to answer their questions and assist
them and judicial time required to explain trial procedures and assist in the
presentation of evidence.14
The extent of the pro se phenomenon reveals a tension between the way
the system is designed (based on the assumption of representation) and the
realities with which it is dealing now (a huge percentage of unrepresented
litigants).15 In addition to the attempts to increase access to counsel, then,
we suggest that the width of the pro se phenomenon and the challenges it
presents, the various reasons that bring people to represent themselves, and
the realities faced by them, also require us to rethink the meaning of, and
connection between, access to counsel and access to justice.
12. One central problem in this context is the tension between judicial impartiality, a
central feature of the adversarial process, and the need for judges to assist pro se litigants.
See generally Cynthia Gray, Reaching Out or Overreaching: Judicial Ethics and SelfRepresented Litigants, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 97 (2007); Richard Zorza,
The Disconnect Between the Requirements of Judicial Neutrality and Those of the Appearance of Neutrality when Parties Appear Pro Se: Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and
Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423 (2004).
13. Interestingly, studies have actually found that represented-party cases are the most
time consuming and that in some types of cases (such as family cases), the presence of selfrepresented litigants actually speeds procedures and requires fewer resources. Also, studies
have found that pro se cases were being settled at the same rates as those with represented
parties, refuting the notion that pro se cases always go to trial and never settle. See, e.g.,
Drew A. Swank, The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 373, 384-85 (2005); see also
GREACEN, supra note 11, at 10-11.
14. See GREACEN, supra note 11, at 12; John. M. Greacen, Framing the Issues for the
Summit on the Future of Self-Represented Litigation, in THE FUTURE OF SELF-REPRESENTED
LITIGATION: REPORT FROM THE MARCH 2005 SUMMIT 19, 20 (2005).
15. See supra note 11.
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Obviously, access to justice has different meanings and interpretations.16
Access could relate to the process through which a certain grievance is
turned into a legal claim and brought before the court. It could relate to financial barriers that prevent individuals from bringing a case before the
court system. Access to justice is not just a formal concept; it relates also
to what happens within the court. Access to justice should be understood
to include what happens when lay people interact with the court system,
and the degree to which they can have meaningful legal redress. Such
meaningful legal redress, i.e. obtaining justice in legal terms, is traditionally the primary focus of discussions of access to justice. In addition, we will
argue, the pro se litigant’s experience during the process should be included in the discussion, and is important because it shapes both the willingness to accept the outcome and the feeling that “justice was done”, as
well as the opinions that those involved in the system form about judges,
lawyers, the courts, and the legal system.
On the one hand, in a system in which legal knowledge and experience
is important, it would be easy to assume that people want, and are more satisfied when they receive, professional legal representation. On the other
hand, having a lawyer to speak on one’s behalf also means that one does
not (in fact normally cannot) speak for oneself. Hence, a represented party
loses the opportunity to directly address the decision-maker, ceding that
right to the attorney. Under the current design of the system, the
represented litigant loses any structured role in the process; the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not assign the litigant himself any structured
opportunities to speak before the court other than if he chooses to testify.
Likewise, the Rules do not require the litigant’s own signature on most
documents submitted to the court,17 and do not even require the litigant’s

16. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3-19, 47-68 (2004); Stephen L.
Pepper, Access to What?, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEG. ETH. 269, 269-70 (1999) (Pepper distinguishes between two meanings of “access to justice”: the first refers to “the distribution of
lawyer services in regard to litigation, and in the attendant negotiations of disputes prior to
litigation,” and the second “focus[es] not just on litigation and dispute resolution, but on
access to legal advice more generally”); Deborah L. Rhode, Equal Justice Under Law: Connecting Principle to Practice, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47 (2003). See also Lois Bloom &
Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475, 476 (2002) (“The literature on access to justice generally uses the term ‘legal assistance’ to mean the provision of counsel, whether subsidized by
the government or compensated by contingency fee or other arrangement, to a party who
cannot afford representation. Access to justice, however, should also entail other forms of
legal assistance, including a court structure that responds fairly and efficiently to claimants
who lack the legal equipage needed to present their cases in an effective way.”).
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
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presence in pretrial conferences, which are meant to enhance the management of the dispute and possibly facilitate its settlement.18
The level of involvement of the represented litigant depends then on his
lawyer (who can work less or more to inform the client and have him involved in the process), on the judicial attitude and methods of the court,
and on the desires and abilities of the litigant himself.19 In reality then, the
difference in the experience of represented and unrepresented litigants
could be as big as the difference between complete reliance on one’s attorney and having no active involvement in the legal process, on the one hand,
and having complete independence in the management of the litigation,
with no professional assistance, on the other.
This gap might be mitigated if we think of different lawyering strategies
and modifications in the court environment that would allow greater participation on behalf of represented litigants, and more support and assistance
to unrepresented litigants. Before discussing such potential changes, however, we want to examine what is currently known about the psychological
experiences of those who are and are not represented by lawyers.
II. THE SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF LITIGANTS: EMPIRICAL
FINDINGS TO DATE
Our concern in this section is with one specific subset of the empirical literature on trials; it is with what we know about parties’ subjective experiences during trials and, in particular, whether those experiences are linked
to their access to, and/or use of, lawyers. The following is a review of what
the existing literature, especially in the area of procedural justice, reveals

18. FED. R. CIV. P. 16. Even outside the courtroom, represented clients usually play a
very small role in negotiations leading to settlement, as these are usually managed by their
lawyers. See Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers’ Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using
Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 269, 333 (1999).
19. The procedural design, as well as the prevalent lawyer-client relationship, result in
many represented litigants having little control and involvement in the litigation process. In
a Rand study that dealt with tort litigants, a majority reported having little control over their
cases. LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS’ VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURTANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 69 (1989). Most litigants
attributed this to the lawyer, the court, or both. Less than 10% regarded their lack of control
as resulting from their own choice. Deborah R. Hensler, The Real World of Tort Litigation,
in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 155, 164-65 (Austin Sarat ed., 1998). This
finding is in accord with other data indicating that litigants feel that they lack control over
the legal process. Kritzer, reporting the results of the Civil Litigation Research Project, also
concludes that “control rests largely with the lawyer, particularly when the client is an individual,” and that “clients simply are not very involved in most cases.” HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGATION 60, 62 (1990).
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about the experiences, perceptions and expectations of individuals concerning justice, fairness and the legal process—with or without the assistance of
an attorney.
In 1975 John Thibaut, a psychologist, and Laurens Walker, a lawyer,
published their pioneering book Procedural Justice.20 That monograph reported on their empirical studies of the experience of people involved in
dispute resolution proceedings, and made the claim that the perceived procedural justice of legal procedures shaped people’s reactions to them. This
procedural justice argument—that people care about procedural values no
less than they care about outcomes, and that procedural values play a significant role in people’s evaluations of, and satisfaction with, procedures in
which they have participated—is now widely supported by a large body of
empirical studies.21
The procedural justice literature has shown that people’s concerns about
procedural values exist independently of whether they win or lose, that
people look for more than winning in their interactions with the legal system, and that they evaluate the fairness of legal processes according to a
large variety of criteria.22 The argument is that:
What law has summarized under the “due process” rubric, social scientists
capture as a bundle of interests, needs, or wants described in a variety of
ways—vindication, attention, accountability, information, accuracy, comfort, respect, recognition, dignity, efficacy, empowerment, [and] justice
. . . . Research on litigants . . . reveals a group of individuals who seek
something in addition to money.23

Research indicates that procedural values not only influence individuals’
evaluations of the fairness of any specific process, but that greater perceived fairness also enhances “voluntary acceptance of decisions, voluntary
compliance with legal rules, and the willingness to proactively help society

20. See generally JOHN THIBAUT
CHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975).

& LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSY-

21. For example, a study of tort litigants found that “objective case outcomes, costs of
litigation and time to disposition contribute less to plaintiffs’ satisfaction with the litigation
process than perceived fairness of the process.” Resnik et al., supra note 7, at 372. For review of additional studies see: E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); E. Allan Lind et al., Procedure and Outcome Effects on Reactions to Adjudicated Resolution of Conflicts of Interest, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
643 (1980).
22. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, ROBERT J. BOECKMANN, HEATHER J. SMITH & YUEN J. HUO,
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN DIVERSE SOCIETY 88 (1997) [hereinafter TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE];
Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103 (1988).
23. Resnik et al., supra note 7, at 363-64.
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and social authorities.”24 In other words, perceived procedural fairness enhances the perceived legitimacy of legal institutions as well as citizens’
commitment to the law.25
An example of the findings of procedural justice in that respect can be
drawn from a study of public willingness to accept judicial decisions in two
California communities—Oakland and Los Angeles.26 This study considered both those who came to these authorities seeking help, and those being regulated by the authorities. The sample included 1,656 people in Los
Angeles and Oakland with a recent personal experience with the police or
the courts. Fourteen percent (239 people) had contact with a court.27
Why did people who dealt with the courts accept court decisions? The
study asked participants about their willingness to accept such decisions.
In particular, it focused on willing acceptance, rather than mere compliance. It also asked about participants’ overall evaluations of the law, the
courts, and the legal system.28
Reactions to the court could potentially be linked to three judgments
people made about their personal experiences in court: whether the procedures used by the court were just; whether the outcome was just; and/or
whether the outcome was favorable.29 Researchers applied a regression
analysis to explore the influence of these various factors on the willingness
to accept decisions made by the court.30 As expected by the procedural justice argument, the primary factor shaping the willingness to accept decisions was the perceived fairness of court procedures.31 Procedural justice
was also the primary factor shaping the influence of personal experience
upon overall views about the court system.32 What is striking is that proce-

24. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 82. It is also argued that procedures
that are evaluated as fair by all participants, “facilitate[] the maintenance of positive relations among group members and preserves the fabric of society, even in the face of the conflict of interest . . . .” Id. at 99.
25. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski, Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 621 (1991).
26. TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 28 (2002).
27. The rest had contact with the police. Id. at 33.
28. Id. at 28.
29. Id. at 54.
30. In addition, the study measured and controlled for other potentially important factors, including the person’s ideology, age, level of education, income, gender, city of residence, ethnicity (African-American, Hispanic, white); and whether the person appeared in
court voluntarily.
31. TYLER & HUO, supra note 26, at 54-57.
32. Id. at 55.

TYLER_CHRISTENSEN

484

3/12/2010 1:57 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXVII

dural justice overwhelms other factors, explaining three to four times as
much of the variance in both decision acceptance and court evaluations.
The findings noted above are especially important because they are true
of people irrespective of their social or economic background. The California study was designed to compare the experiences of White, Hispanic,
and African-American residents of Los Angeles and Oakland. The members of all three groups reacted in basically the same ways to their experiences. The same is true of those who were economically advantaged and
disadvantaged, men and women, and those with varying degrees of education. It was also true of plaintiffs and defendants, and of people who dealt
with the police or the courts.33 In other words, people generally reacted to
their experience in terms of procedural justice whatever their background,
suggesting that focusing on procedural justice is a very good way to build
trust and encourage compliance irrespective of who is using the courts.
The strong link between procedural justice and evaluations of the courts
was recently affirmed by another study conducted within the State Courts
of California. The Administrative Office of the Courts undertook a study
in 2005 in which a random sample of the residents of the state was interviewed about trust and confidence in the California courts. An analysis of
that information34 suggests that “[h]aving a sense that court decisions are
made through processes that are fair is the strongest predictor by far of
whether members of the public approve of or have confidence in the California courts.”35 The California courts are rated as being very fair in terms
of treating people with dignity and respect, but not particularly fair in terms
of allowing them to participate in decisions that affect them. The report argues that “[p]olicies that promote procedural fairness offer the vehicle with
the greatest potential for changing how the public views the state courts.”36
Interestingly, the report points to experiences with low-stakes courts, such
as traffic court, as a particular source of dissatisfaction. It goes on to argue
that all experiences with legal authorities, even relatively trivial interactions, are important to members of the public and need to be the focus of
court-design efforts.37

33. Id. at 141-64.
34. ROTTMAN, supra note 10. Analyses of the data from that survey which are presented
in this article are from Tom R. Tyler & David Rottman, Public Views about the California
Courts (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Both are based on a study of California state residents that involved interviews with a sample of 2414 people.
35. ROTTMAN, supra note 10, at 6.
36. Id. at 7.
37. One reason that these findings are particularly important is that they provide an independent confirmation that procedural justice issues matter in real court settings. This
study was not conducted or evaluated by the academic researchers who have been responsi-
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These procedural justice findings point to the centrality of process issues
in the reactions of litigants to their experiences in court. They suggest that
issues of “due process,” as these are perceived by the public, are the key to
creating and sustaining trust and confidence in the courts. Hence, the findings reinforce the value of viewing the issue of access to counsel within
this general framework of creating a litigation experience that involves a
fair procedure—perceived as such—for resolving disputes. The question
remains: what are the elements that make such a process and how are they
connected to providing people with an attorney? In other words, the value,
goals, and quality of legal representation should be examined in view of the
set of criteria people use to evaluate their legal experience, in addition to
the outcomes obtained by them.

ble for many of the early studies of procedural justice. Instead, the need for this study arose
within the framework of court concerns in California; the study was designed and conducted
within the framework of the administrative offices of the courts, and the report was written
by David Rottman, a researcher at the National Center for State Courts. Similar conclusions
have also been reached by other judicial leaders. The white paper on procedural fairness
authored by Judges Kevin Burke and Steve Leben, is another example. KEVIN BURKE &
STEVE LEBEN, AM. JUDGES ASS’N, PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS: A KEY INGREDIENT IN PUBLIC SATISFACTION (2007) available at http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/htdocs/AJAWhitePaper9-26-07.pdf.
Another white paper reviews research on procedural justice, including recent studies conducted within the court systems of Hennepin County, Minnesota, under Judge Burke’s direction, and in Brooklyn, New York. M. SOMJEN FRAZER, THE IMPACT OF THE COMMUNITY
COURT MODEL ON DEFENDANT PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS: A CASE STUDY AT THE RED HOOK
COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTER (2006), available at http://courtinnovation.org/_uploads/
documents/Procedural_Fairness.pdf. Again, these court-designed and sponsored evaluations
point to the importance of procedural justice in encouraging satisfaction, decision acceptance, and trust and confidence in the courts. See M. Somjen Frazer, Examining Defendant
Perceptions of Fairness in the Courtroom, 91(1) JUDICATURE 36 (2007); Jake Horowitz,
Making Every Encounter Count: Building Trust and Confidence in the Police, 256 NAT’L
INST. JUST. J. 8 (2007) available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/jr000256c.
pdf.

TYLER_CHRISTENSEN

486

3/12/2010 1:57 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.
A.

[Vol. XXXVII

Procedural Justice Criteria: Voice, Representation, and
Participation38

Whether people have an attorney has not been generally studied within a
procedural justice framework, and the question of legal representation has
not been significantly investigated. As we discuss below, however, research does confirm that the ability to be represented before the court, with
or without counsel, is central to designing procedures that people view as
fair.
Thibaut and Walker identified the opportunity to present one’s arguments to the decision-maker (which they term “control”) as central to individuals’ evaluations of the fairness of trial procedures.39 Since the publication of their work, a large body of literature has developed on people’s subsubjective evaluations of both trials and of more informal legal procedures.
That literature suggests that people value the opportunity to present their
arguments to legal authorities in either a formal or an informal legal procedure. The original research, however, did not address the distinction between personally presenting arguments, and evidence and indirect representation through an attorney. For example, in their work, Thibaut and Walker
do not distinguish between situations where there is some control in the
hands of the disputant himself and situations where the control is solely in
the hands of the lawyer. Moreover, they do not include the role of the lawyer in their basic model of dispute. They explain this absence by saying
that due to their professional expertise lawyers can only increase the litigant’s perceived control over the process.40
Irrespective of whether it is direct or indirect, there is a great deal of evidence suggesting that people want voice in legal proceedings and react to
the extent that they do or do not receive it.41 Evidence for the value of
38. The terms that we use here—voice, participation, and representation—are common
terms in the procedural justice literature, but they are often used to mean different things. In
this article we use voice to relate to self expression opportunities in which the litigant is allowed to express his concerns and views with regard to the problem at hand. Voice is typically used to refer to a more direct form of participation, such as occurs when a person directly addresses the decision-maker. Participation is a somewhat broader term that relates
to all of the ways in which one can play a role in the dispute resolution process (including
voice). We use representation to relate generally to the extent and ways in which the litigant’s case is presented before the decision-maker (it could relate either to representation by
an attorney or to self representation).
39. For an elaborated discussion of this conclusion, see THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note
20, at 117-24.
40. John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541, 547
n.14 (1978).
41. The first to use the term “voice” as an element of procedural justice evaluations was
Robert Folger, who defined having a voice in a system as “having some form of participa-
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voice comes from studies concerning which aspects of the court experience
litigants associate with justice. The aspects found to most strongly influence the experience of litigants are voice, neutrality, respect, and trust.
Voice/Representation. People want to have the opportunity to present
their side of the story in their own words, before decisions are made about
how to handle the dispute or problem. Having an opportunity to voice their
perspective has a positive effect upon people’s experience with the legal
system irrespective of their outcome, as long as they feel that the authority
sincerely considered their arguments before making a decision. The value
people place on the ability to “tell their story” reappears in various studies.
For example, a study of small claims courts found that the opportunity for
direct, unmitigated participation—especially the opportunity for the litigant
to tell his story before a judge—was an important determinant of the litigant’s satisfaction. 42 Again, however, this literature mostly does not distinguish between directly voicing one’s concerns and presenting one’s evidence and having this occur through one’s attorney.
Neutrality. People bring their disputes to the court because they view
judges as neutral, principled decision-makers, who make decisions based
upon rules and not personal opinions, and who apply legal rules consistently across people and over cases.43 To emphasize this aspect of the court
experience, judges should be transparent and open about how the rules are
being applied and how decisions are being made. Explanations emphasizing the application of relevant rules are helpful.

tion in decision making by expressing one’s own opinion.” Robert Folger, Distributive and
Procedural Justice: Combined Impact of “Voice” and Improvement on Experienced Inequity, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 108, 109 (1977). Following Folger, literature in the
field began using the term voice, sometimes defined as “an opportunity to express [the individual’s] position before a decision is made,” or as the ability of the disputant to tell his story and present his arguments. Blair H. Sheppard, Justice is No Simple Matter: Case for
Elaborating our Model of Procedural Fairness, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952,
954 (1985); Tom R. Tyler, Kenneth A. Rasinski & Nancy Spodick, Influence of Voice on
Satisfaction with Leaders: Exploring the Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 72 (1985).
42. William M. O’Barr & John M. Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy
in Small Claims Court Narratives, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 661, 677 (1985) (noting that
“[l]itigants uniformly take advantage of the opportunity to talk . . . and some even offer unsolicited unfavorable comments about this aspect of the procedure”).
43. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 137 (1990). An example of the importance of respect can be found in another study which found that, “litigants’ assessment of
procedural fairness was not based on whether they had an opportunity to participate in the
process (e.g. vent), but rather on their perceptions of the carefulness and neutrality of the
third party and the dignity of the process.” Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It’s Not True:
Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 81, 95 (2002).
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Respect. Legal authorities, whether police officers, court clerks, or
judges, represent the state and communicate important messages to people
about their status in society. Respect for people and their rights affirm to
people that they are viewed as important and valuable, and are included
within the rights and protections that form one aspect of the connection that
people have to government and law. People want to feel that when they
have concerns and problems both they and their problems will be taken seriously by the legal system.
Respect matters at all stages, and involves police officers and court
clerks as well as judges. It includes both treating people well, that is, with
courtesy and politeness, and showing respect for people’s rights.44 For example, when people come to court they are often confused about how cases
are handled. Providing people with information about what to do, where to
go, and when to appear, all demonstrate respect both for those people and
for their right to have their problems handled fairly by the courts. Brochures or web sites explaining court procedures, as well as aids such as
help desks are found to be valuable.45
Trust. Studies of legal and political authorities consistently show that
the central attribute that influences public evaluations of legal authorities is
an assessment of the character of the decision-maker.46 The key elements
in this evaluation involve issues of sincerity and caring. People infer
whether they feel that court personnel, such as judges, are listening to and
considering their views; are being honest and open about the basis for their
actions; are trying to do what is right for everyone involved; and are acting
in the interests of the parties, not out of personal prejudices.
Using the data collected in the study of personal experiences with the
courts in Oakland and Los Angeles discussed above, it is possible to examine the potential influence of these four antecedents of procedural justice. An analysis of the four factors considered at the same time suggests
that neutrality, trust, and respect directly shape overall evaluations of procedural justice, but that voice does not. An analysis that allows both direct
and indirect influences indicates, however, that voice is indirectly important because it shapes evaluations about neutrality, trust, and respect.
People who feel that they have voice, in other words, view the procedures as more neutral, have more trust in the decision-maker, and feel that
they have been treated with greater respect. An analysis that considers both
44. See TYLER, supra note 43, at 138.
45. See GREACEN, supra note 11, at 16-19.
46. See E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE PERCEPTION OF
JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS’ VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 61-67 (1989); ROTTMAN, supra note 10, at 24.
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direct and indirect influences at the same time indicates that all four factors
matter, with voice having the strongest influence, followed respectively by
neutrality, trust, and respect. Interestingly, neither outcome favorability
nor outcome fairness directly influences overall procedural justice judgments. This data supports the argument that having the opportunity to
present one’s case leads people to feel that the forum is more neutral, the
authorities more trustworthy, and the procedure more respectful of them
and their rights. For all of these reasons litigants are more likely to accept
decisions and evaluate the legal system more favorably after they have experienced voice.
B.

Voice in Direct and Indirect Participation

As we have noted, the opportunity to present one’s case can occur either
directly, as in an informal legal procedure such as mediation, or as a pro se
litigant in court, or indirectly through an attorney. The attorney interviews
her clients and organizes the arguments into a legally relevant, and hopefully compelling, presentation of the case.
The key psychological issue raised by pro se litigation is whether people
have different reactions to direct and indirect participation in legal procedures. A subsequent important question is how people evaluate and rate
different factors that are influenced by direct or indirect participation, such
as different levels of voice and control, different levels of knowledge and
understanding of the legal process and their rights, or the support provided
by having a professional on your side. These are just a few of the many
ways in which having or not having an attorney can influence the experience of a litigant.
In order to answer these questions, in face of the limited data, we must
understand the value of voice and the different effects it has on people’s legal experiences. In the original work of Thibaut and Walker, people’s desire for voice was linked to their desire to present their arguments in a
compelling way and thereby influence the judge to make a favorable decision.47 This argument is consistent with the suggestion that people want to
have an attorney who can make a more compelling case on their behalf. In
its original incarnation, the Thibaut and Walker model is instrumental and
suggests that one’s desire to speak is directly linked to the view that one’s

47. See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 20, at 117-24; Thibault & Walker, supra note
40, at 524, 549.
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arguments can influence the court’s decision.48 It is easy to imagine that
effective legal representation could facilitate such influence.
As research on voice has developed, however, it has moved away from
the instrumental view and increasingly emphasized people’s desire for personal recognition by authorities.49 Indeed, later work on the psychology of
voice suggests that the experience of voice has interpersonal or “valueexpressive” worth that is not linked to any influence over the final decision.50 These studies show that people still rate a procedure to be more fair
if they had voice (versus no voice), even if they know that what they said
had little or no influence on the outcome of their proceeding.51 Even more
strikingly, this holds true even when the opportunity for voice comes after
the decision was already made.52 These findings demonstrate that voice
has value beyond its ability to shape outcomes.
What factors drive the influence of voice, besides influence over the
eventual outcome or decision? We might hypothesize that when an authority listens to a person’s arguments, the authority confers interpersonal respect on that person, acknowledging his rights as a citizen and as a person,
and validating his status as a person in good standing in society. This argument is supported by the finding that people only value such voice opportunities if they feel that the authority is “considering” their arguments.53
This suggests that people focus on whether the decision-maker treats their
concerns and needs in the situation with respect (by receiving good faith
consideration), independently of whether the decision-maker adopts the
course of action the people recommend to resolve those concerns.

48. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 20, at 118. This instrumental view is also favored
by other procedural justice researchers. See, e.g., Gerald S. Leventhal, What Should Be
Done With Equity Theory? New Approaches to the Study of Fairness in Social Relationships, in SOCIAL EXCHANGE: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 32 (K.J. Gergen, M.S.
Greenberg & R. H. Willis eds., 1980).
49. E. Allen Lind, Ruth Kanfer & P. Christopher Earley, Voice, Control and Procedural
Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952 (1990).
50. Tom R. Tyler, Conditions Leading to Value-Expressive Effects in Judgments of Procedural Justice: A Test of Four Models, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 333, 333
(1987).
51. Tyler et al., supra note 41.
52. Lind et al., supra note 49, at 957. At the same time, it is important to note that voice
with no influence might also heighten feelings of procedural injustice and dissatisfaction.
“[W]hen people feel that their opportunity to speak is a ‘sham,’ rather than an honest opportunity to influence the decision, they may react to that opportunity with anger.” Tyler et al.,
supra note 41, at 74.
53. Tyler, supra note 22.
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To the degree that people see voice as communicating concern and consideration by legal authorities, or as affirming their status and value, direct
voice might be as desirable, or even more desirable, than representation by
a lawyer. No data exists, however, to clearly support this hypothesis. The
data presented here shows clearly that voice matters to people. What is not
clear is if it matters whether that voice is direct or indirect. That distinction
is central to the issue at hand here, since pro se litigation is direct participation in which people represent their own positions, by making their own arguments and presenting their own evidence, whereas having an attorney
constitutes mostly indirect participation. As has been noted, there are
plausible reasons for thinking that either direct or indirect participation
might be experienced as the fairest procedure.
One source of evidence about direct versus indirect voice is the comparison of trials and informal dispute resolution. While the distinction is not
absolute, people are more likely to have opportunities to directly voice their
concerns to the decision-maker in alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”)
procedures such as mediation.54 Studies of mediation suggest that it is
popular among its participants, at least in comparison to traditional adjudication.55 This popularity is linked to the opportunities for direct participation in discussions about one’s case, as well as the opportunity to present
arguments about one’s situation and needs. Mediation research suggests
that people like direct participation, at least in informal legal procedures.56
For example, a recent experiment examining participants’ preferences for
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms found that they preferred
processes that allowed them to present evidence on their own behalf without the help of a representative.57 The question remains though, whether
litigants would prefer direct participation in more formal settings, where
representation by a lawyer might carry different benefits than it does in
mediation and other less formal settings.
In trying to answer this question it is important to note that research
about individuals’ preferences for different types of dispute resolution me-

54. Sternlight, supra note 18, at 333.
55. The question of the popularity of mediation procedures is complicated. People do
not tend to freely choose mediation over litigation. But, once they have participated in a
mediation process they would demonstrate high levels of satisfaction with the process. See
Donna Shestowsky, Procedural Preferences in Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Closer,
Modern Look at an Old Idea, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 211 (2004) (reviewing studies
of participants’ assessments of mediation); see also Hensler, supra note 43 (questioning the
use of mandatory mediation and litigants’ preference of non-adversarial procedures).
56. See generally Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Disputant Concerns in Mediation, 3
NEGOTIATION J. 367 (1987).
57. Shestowsky, supra note 55.
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chanisms does not provide clear answers, perhaps because it is difficult to
compare different procedures on any one dimension. While mediation and
other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are found to be popular
among participants, they are not necessarily always evaluated as providing
greater participation opportunities than trials, or as being fairer. This issue
was addressed in a study conducted by the RAND Corporation in which
trials, court-annexed arbitration, and judicial settlement conferences were
compared.58 Litigants in each procedure were asked to evaluate their opportunities for participation. Interestingly, people rated their opportunities
for participation as being highest in trials. As the authors conclude:
The procedure that is often asserted to offer little opportunity for direct litigant involvement—trial—was in fact that which received the highest
participation ratings among both defendants and plaintiffs. One explanation might be that the process of preparing for trial and the experience of
testifying at trial led to feelings of having participated in the litigation
process.59

The previously mentioned 2005 California court study of a random sample of Californians asked people to evaluate the courts on a number of dimensions.60 Voice (defined as being listened to) was among the lowestranked dimension of the courts, with about 35% of those interviewed indicating that the courts do not listen to people.61 This suggests that there is a
widespread perception that people lack voice in the courts. Among those
with personal experience in courts, 38% indicated that courts do not listen,
as compared to 30% among those without experience.62 Hence, people are
more likely to say that courts do not listen to people if they have actually
been to court. Yet, the degree to which people evaluate procedures as providing voice can be based on various factors, including whether or not they
were represented, as well as factors such as the attitudes of judges, the de-

58. LIND ET AL., supra note 46.
59. Id. at 72. In this study, litigants were usually excluded from participating in the judicial settlement conferences, which meant that they could not even witness the process
through which decisions were made. This led more people to experience mistrust and dissatisfaction with this process.
60. ROTTMAN, supra note 10, at 9.
61. Id.
62. See Tyler & Rottman, supra note 34. Additional findings include: 20% of the public
said that juries were not representative, 21% said that people were not treated with dignity,
28% said that the courts do not make sure that judges follow the rules, and 31% said that the
courts do not take peoples’ needs into account. Rottman, supra note 10, at 9 (percentages
estimated from Rottman’s bar graph). Also, only 19% of respondents said that local judges
were not honest, 29% said that local courts were out of touch with the community, and 34%
said that the California courts do not protect everyone’s Constitutional rights. Rottman, supra note 10, at 32.
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sign of court procedures, limitations imposed by evidence law, caseload,
etc. There is a need, then, to examine more closely the specific impact of
representation on people’s evaluations of their court experiences.
C.

Does it Matter to People if They Have a Lawyer and in What
Ways?

Does it matter if people have a lawyer when they go to court? It is possible that people with an attorney feel more able to effectively represent
their case in court. It is also possible, though, that people with an attorney
feel denied the opportunity to speak their mind, leading them to feel less
fairly treated. This would suggest that pro se litigation might have the benefit of giving people a stronger feeling of voice. Obviously, when we
speak here about the potential benefits of pro se litigation, we focus on
those psychological benefits—i.e., those factors that better the subjective
experiences of litigants. We do not consider the questions of whether, and
how much, having a lawyer betters the outcome obtained by litigants, or
possible biases in the system against pro se litigants.63
Tyler looked at how going to court with or without a lawyer influenced
the litigation experience of individuals. He did so among a random sample
of 1,575 of Chicago residents.64 Each person was asked if they had had recent experience with legal authorities. Of the 733 with recent experience,
147 indicated that their most important recent experience was with a
court.65 The study focused upon people’s subjective experience during
their visit to the courts, not their objective outcomes. It did not, for example, examine whether lawyers obtained better outcomes for their clients.
Instead it looked at how people evaluated their experience.
Of the recent court users interviewed by Tyler, 29% had an attorney, and
71% did not. People were more likely to have a lawyer when they viewed
the legal issues involved as serious (r = .35, p < .001) and if they were the
plaintiff in the case (r = .29, p < .001). Age, race, income, education, and
gender did not, however, influence whether people had a lawyer.

63. For example, even in small claims courts, institutions designed with the intent to
serve pro se litigants and provide simpler, cheaper, and more accessible legal services, studies have found that pro se litigants do not get as good results as represented litigants, and
especially do not get good results when appearing against a represented litigant. See Steven
Weller, John C. Ruhnka, & John A. Martin, American Small Claims Courts, in SMALL
CLAIMS COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 11 (Christopher J. Whelan ed., 1990).
64. TYLER, supra note 43, at 8. The data reported is described in general terms but is
reanalyzed by the authors for this paper.
65. Id. at 12.
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The study looked at four judgments that people made about their experience. First, people were asked whether they felt they had received a desirable outcome. Second, they were asked whether they felt that the procedures were fair. Third, they were asked whether they felt that they had an
opportunity to present their case to the judge. Fourth, they were asked
about their feelings (anger, happiness, etc.) with regard to their experience
with the courts.
In each case regression analysis was used to examine the influence of
whether people had a lawyer on the relevant evaluation, controling for the
seriousness of the case and whether the person was the plaintiff. That regression analysis indicated that whether people had a lawyer did not significantly influence the following: whether they felt that their outcome was
desirable; whether they believed that the procedures were fair; and whether
they had an opportunity to present their case. Finally, whether people had a
lawyer did not influence their post-experience feelings. In this study at
least, controling upon case characteristics, there is no evidence that, whether people had a lawyer shaped their evaluations of their experience in
court.66
Similar findings emerge from a study of pro se divorce litigants in Arizona, which found that self-represented litigants had the same level of positive reaction to their court experience as represented ones, while pro se litigants had fewer dissatisfied and very dissatisfied reactions than represented
litigants. In other words, in the Arizona study self-representation lowered
unfavorable reactions, but did not heighten favorable ones.67
Going back to Tyler’s study, it is especially striking that there were no
differences in the degrees to which people felt that they were able to
present their evidence to the judge, since having a lawyer leads to a more
indirect form of participation. Hence, people did not indicate feeling deprived of voice via this indirect form of participation.
Another study examining unrepresented litigants was conducted among
Australian adults on trial for driving after drinking. In the study, 397 adults
who had courtroom trials were examined, of whom 138 had an attorney and
259 did not. Participants were asked to assess their court experiences.68

66. Id. at 137-38. If we ignore differences in seriousness, we find that people with lawyers report more negative outcomes, less fair procedures, and more negative feelings, all
possibly due to the fact that they have more difficult and serious cases.
67. GREACEN, supra note 11, at 4.
68. See generally Tom R. Tyler et al., Reintegrative Shaming, Procedural Justice, and
Recidivism: The Engagement of Offenders’ Psychological Mechanisms in the Canberra
RISE Drinking-and-Driving Experiment, 41 L. & SOC’Y REV. 553 (2007).
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The results of the study suggest, first, that litigants did not believe that
they received a worse outcome,69 or were more strongly pressured to accept
an outcome,70 if they did not have a lawyer. Those with a lawyer, however,
did feel they better understood their rights,71 were treated with greater respect,72 and were not disadvantaged during the trial.73 On the other hand,
those without lawyers felt they had greater opportunity to speak.74 Interestingly, though, this did not mean that they felt they had control over what
happened,75 since those with lawyers felt more in control. Finally, those
with lawyers were more likely to say that their respect for law enforcement
increased through their experience,76 and were found to have higher levels
of perceived legitimacy than did those without lawyers.77
These findings are similar to others noted in that the gains of having a
lawyer are not necessarily linked to the actual outcome; they come through
a sense of understanding what is happening and feeling comfortable in the
courtroom setting.78 These feelings, at least in this study, meant that having a lawyer was linked to higher levels of legitimacy and respect for the

69. The question was, “How severe was your sentence?” The mean for represented litigants was 2.31, and for those not represented it was 2.40 (t(305) = 0.84, not significant).
The findings discussed in this paragraph come from the reanalysis of the dataset underlying
Tyler et al., supra note 68.
70. The question was, “Were you pushed into accepting an outcome?” The mean for
represented litigants was 2.38, and for those not represented it was 2.45 (t(306) = 0.47, not
significant).
71. The question was, “Did you understand your rights?” The mean for represented litigants was 3.68, and for those not represented it was 3.32 (t(306) = 2.82, p<.01).
72. The question was, “Were you treated with respect?” The mean for represented litigants was 3.68, and for those not represented it was 3.47 (t(306) = 1.68, p<.10).
73. The question was, “Would you say that you were not disadvantaged during the trial?” The mean for represented litigants was 2.95, and for those not represented it was 2.60
(t(306) = 2.62, p<.01).
74. The question was, “You felt you had an opportunity to express your views?” The
mean for represented litigants was 3.38, and for those not represented it was 3.63 (t(306) =
1.91, p<.10).
75. The question was, “You had enough control over the ways things were run in the
conference/court?” The mean for represented litigants was 3.07, and for those not
represented it was 2.81 (t(305) = 1.91, p<.10).
76. The question was, “Would you say your respect for the police has gone up?” The
mean for represented litigants was 3.18, and for those not represented it was 2.97 (t(306) =
2.25, p<.05). Tyler et al., supra note 68, at 580.
77. The question was, “Do you view the law as legitimate?” The mean for represented
litigants was 4.06, and for those not represented it was 3.86 (t(305) = 2.35, p<.05). Id. at
580.
78. See Mather, supra note 11, at 151-53; Karl Monsma & Richard Lempert, The Value
of Counsel: 20 Years of Representation Before a Public Housing Eviction Board, 26 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 627 (1992) (discussing the ways in which lawyers actually do or do not benefit
their clients in different legal settings).
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law. Consistent with other studies, however, people also felt that when
they had a lawyer they traded the opportunity to speak for other gains.
To conclude thus far, none of the studies suggest that people represented
by lawyers express lower levels of control over the outcome or dissatisfaction with limited opportunities for voice, when compared with unrepresented litigants. Hence, the evidence supports the suggestion that indirect
participation does not diminish the perception of voice. Given the general
value of voice, this is important. The studies outlined suggest that people
who go to court with or without lawyers have similar feelings about their
voice during their trial experience. Having a lawyer, however, may change
other judgments, as the Australian study suggests.
The possible advantages of having a lawyer, and the impact of legal representation on the experience of those participating in legal processes, are
reinforced by a study of pretrial arbitration conducted by the RAND Corporation.79 The RAND study found differences in perceptions of fairness
among represented and unrepresented litigants:
Pro se respondents . . . were more likely than represented litigants to believe they had been treated unfairly, and more likely to be dissatisfied.
They were also more likely than represented litigants to believe that the
arbitrators’ decision was “unjust,” to perceive the arbitrators themselves
as biased, and to report difficulty in gathering and submitting evidence related to their case. . . . The differences between [represented and unrepresented] litigant samples are not large enough to be statistically significant.
Nevertheless, the generally negative shift in the distributions of pro se litigants’ attitudes is a disturbing note.80

In this study, the fifteen pro se respondents were less successful in
achieving their desired outcomes compared to the fifty-one represented litigants. Thirty-nine percent of those represented were evaluated as having
won in objective terms, while only 20% of the pro se litigants won their
cases.81 In addition, as noted above, unrepresented litigants generally felt
less fairly treated. The report notes a number of problems with unrepresented litigants—such as difficulty in understanding what was expected of
them at hearings, difficulties in preparing a case that involved relevant/admissible evidence,82 and problems resulting from their engaging in
legally irrelevant actions while in court, behaviors that upset the arbitra-

79. JANE W. ADLER, DEBORAH R. HENSLER & CHARLES E. NELSON, RAND CORP., SIMJUSTICE: HOW LITIGANTS FARE IN THE PITTSBURGH COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM
(1983).
80. Id. at 72.
81. Id. at 73.
82. Id. at 72-74.

PLE
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tors.83 These are all problems that can arise when people lack attorneys—
problems that can lead them, as the study reveals, to feel that they have
been unfairly treated, and consequently might lead to general dissatisfaction with the legal procedure.84 While the small size of the study85 precludes suggesting any systematic differences between represented and unrepresented litigants, the findings do resonate with anecdotal evidence about
the experience of pro se litigants, and with the general notion that pro se
litigants encounter a great deal of difficulty and experience a lot of frustration.
Indeed, frustration is a recurring theme in descriptions of the experiences
of pro se litigants—frustration
from delay; from distrust of opposing parties and counsel; from lack of
familiarity with the law, judicial processes, and even legal terminology;
and from lack of confidence in a legal scheme that routinely refuses to afford amends where the pro se feels they are due. In some cases, the apperception of entitlement to redress is derived from fundamental notions
of common sense . . . .86

Pro se litigants seem, in fact, to experience all of the difficulties one
would expect a layperson would have when going through a highly professionalized system. While there are no specific rules of procedure that discriminate against pro se litigants, the nature and design of court procedures
are such that nonprofessionals would find them difficult to maneuver. Pro
se litigants need to deal with a language they do not always understand,
evidentiary constraints and procedural protocols. Such rules are not always
in sync with people’s common sense and social instincts, which are based
on their behavior and interactions outside the legal sphere.87
On the other hand, research does evidence possible benefits associated
with self-representation. Moreover, while the common perception of pro se
litigants is that they are forced to represent themselves due to the cost of
legal services, 88 and would prefer being represented by an attorney,89 there

83. Id. at 74-76.
84. Id. at 71, 73.
85. Id. at 60.
86. Ira P. Robbins & Susan N. Herman, Litigating Without Counsel: Faretta or for
Worse, 42 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 644-45 (1975).
87. Id. at 655 (“The pro ses’ sensibilities are bruised, for example, by those aspects of
our legal system that members of the bench and the bar take for granted, such as the normal
dalliances of juridical operations, adversarial exaggeration and elocution, and alternative
explanations and interpretations of laws and rules.”).
88. Most low-income and moderate-income individuals cannot afford the cost of counsel. The ABA legal needs study reports that 70-80% of low-income persons are unable to
obtain legal assistance when they need and want it. Of these individuals, most do not take
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are litigants who choose self-representation even when they can afford an
attorney. 90
Studies indicate that the most cited reasons for self-representation are:
inability to pay for an attorney; belief that the matter is simple enough to be
handled without an attorney; and reluctance to pay the high cost of an attorney, despite the ability to pay.91
We would like to focus our discussion here on two other explanations
for choosing self representation. These two explanations—the view of selfrepresentation as an empowering tool, and the choice of self representation
because of the low quality of appointed counsel—we find to be particularly
relevant to our discussion of the various psychological values attached to
direct or indirect participation.
One very interesting view of pro se litigation is the view that identifies
self-representation “as a self-affirming experience that many litigants might
select precisely because of the personal empowerment that arises from
maintaining control over the elements of their case.”92 In theory, it is not
hard to see how pro se litigation has the potential of being an empowering
and self-affirming tool. Pro se litigation allows control over the manage-

their legal issues to court. Nearly 71% of the situations affecting low-income households
that could be addressed by the civil justice system, and 61% of these situations affecting
moderate-income households, do not get into the court systems. At the same time, it is not
clear that the cost of litigation or the lack of access to justice are the reasons for this reality.
Per their reasons for not turning to the civil justice system, low-income persons interviewed
displayed “a sense that legal assistance will not help, and fear of the cost.” The moderateincome persons were less likely to cite cost considerations than those with low income, but
they shared the view that “the justice system would not help.” GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note
10, at 11. For more data on low- and moderate-income households’ access to attorneys, see
Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Services and American-Style Civil Legal Assistance, 41 L. & SOC’Y REV. 79 (2007).
89. See, e.g., Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor:
Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 1992
(1999).
90. Swank reports on a study in which only 31% of the participants said they were pro
se because they could not afford to hire a lawyer, and almost half implied that they had the
funds to hire a counsel but chose not to. Swank, supra note 13, at 378.
91. See GREACEN, supra note 11, at 3-4; John M. Greacen, Framing the Issues for the
Summit on the Future of Self-Representation Litigation, in THE FUTURE OF SELFREPRESENTATION LITIGATION: REPORT FROM THE MARCH 2005 SUMMIT 19, 22 (2005).
Swank lists additional factors including, “increased literacy rates; increased sense of consumerism; increased sense of individualism and belief in one’s own abilities; an anti-lawyer
sentiment; a mistrust of the legal system; a belief that the public defender in criminal cases
is overburdened; a belief that the court will do what is right whether the party is represented
or not; a belief that litigation has been simplified to the point that attorneys are not needed,
and, a trial strategy designed to gain either sympathy or a procedural advantage over
represented parties.” Swank, supra note 13, at 378-79.
92. Scott Barclay, The Decision to Self-Represent, 77 SOC. SCI. Q. 912, 913 (1996).
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ment of one’s case and pro se litigants can choose how to present the case
and which aspects to stress. Their participation in the court procedure is
active and direct. Again, in theory at least, self representation can serve to
solve many of the difficulties and sources of dissatisfaction that characterize the legal experiences of represented litigants (the feeling of passivity
and lack of control, the inability to tell one’s story, or the difficulty of
communicating with lawyers).
In reality, as the data presented here shows, for most pro se litigants,
self-representation does not prove to be such a positive experience. Evidence that individuals benefited from pro se representation on a personal
level is merely anecdotal. Much of this evidence comes from discussions
of the informal dispute resolution literature, which involves procedures
such as mediation that may not be relevant to the courts.
Some interesting evidence comes out of interviews with ten women who
represented themselves through their divorces, with some out of court assistance from a law clinic.93 The women who derived the most from their
pro se experiences attributed their satisfaction to the fact that they themselves were in control over the legal process and that they found the
process to be less complicated than they had imagined before they entered
into it. These women said they felt better about themselves and felt more
competent in other areas of their lives following their pro se experiences.94
For example, one woman described the change: “I used to be scared to do
new tasks at work; I’d always have to stop and ask my supervisor lots of
questions. Now I just plunge right in! She also noticed that she is more assertive, and speaks out more often in her night school classes.”95
At the same time, and despite what was overall a positive experience,
three of the women thought that having a lawyer would have been better.
They believed the process would have been quicker and that they would
have preserved more rights had they been represented. “One woman acknowledged honestly that ‘doing things yourself is just another burden of
being poor. Sure, if I had money I’d hire a lawyer.’”96 When asked
whether they would go pro se again in other legal proceedings, four of the
women said no, while the other six said they would attempt pro se litigation
in future cases.97 It is important to note, however, with regard to the experience of the women interviewed, that although they represented them-

93. Emily Joselson & Judy Kaye, Pro Se Divorce: A Strategy for Empowering Women,
1 LAW & INEQ. 239 (1983).
94. See id. at 245, 249.
95. Id. at 248.
96. Id. at 253.
97. Id. at 254.
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selves, they also enjoyed legal advice and support through participation in
the clinic. As one of them described the process, “I really like doing my
divorce alone – with help!”98 In that sense, their experience is not quite the
typical pro se experience, since many pro se litigants have no access to any
professional legal advice.99
In a study of pro se divorce litigants in Arizona, 70% of those facing
self-represented opponents said they would choose to represent themselves
in the future. Out of those pro se litigants whose opponents had attorneys,
only 36% said they would choose self-representation again in the future.100
Another study, focusing on a group of ninety-five civil appellants in Illinois, Minnesota, and Mississippi, 27% of which were pro se, suggests that
some of the litigants had chosen to appeal without a lawyer “as part of a legal strategy to force the courts to deal with the issue that the litigants, rather
than the legal system, identify as at the heart of their disputes.”101 Yet, litigants in this study were not asked directly about their decision to represent
themselves. The author drew this conclusion from the general feeling, revealed in the interviews “that the primary issue in their case was not among
the issues discussed by the court,”102 or promoted by their lawyers. The
author infers from this data that a possible strategy for litigants to use to
overcome this difficulty is self-representation, which allows litigants “the
ability to place directly before the court the issues that they identified as
most salient.”103 This observation accords with our prior argument that one
benefit of self-representation is the ability to shape the nature of the arguments presented to the legal decision-maker. At the same time, and as the
author recognized, it is not clear at all whether self-representation is a successful strategy in that respect.
It appears that the short-term advantage of redefining the legal focus of
their case might have been purchased at the expense of the long-term legal consequences. Although self-representation gives litigants the ability
to restrict legal transformation of their issues, the result of such control
may be that the litigants are no longer able to fit their claims with the existing legal parameters.104

This observation resonates with the findings of Conley and O’Barr in
their study of self-represented litigants in small claims courts. They define

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 248.
Swank, supra note 13, at 382.
GREACEN, supra note 11, at 4.
Barclay, supra note 92, at 912.
Id. at 917.
Id. at 919.
Id. at 920.
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this difficulty in terms of the legal inadequacy of pro se litigants’ narratives. They found that while the opportunity to tell their story without evidential constraints increased litigants’ satisfaction with the court procedures, it also harmed other interests. Presenting the claims in everyday
language and structure, those narratives often lacked the required components of legally adequate claims, which often resulted in losing the case.105
Another possible motivation for proceeding pro se, of particular relevance to our discussion, is dissatisfaction with the quality of legal representation. A study of pro se defendants in felony cases suggests that many of
them chose to represent themselves because of dissatisfaction with the
counsel appointed to them as well as concerns regarding the quality of that
representation.106 From the pro se defendants in the database who had
counsel at the beginning of the process, more than half had asked the judge
to appoint them a new counsel before they decided to proceed pro se.107 In
addition, the study found that defendants with court-appointed counsel
were more likely to choose to represent themselves than federal felony defendants as a whole.108 The data indicates two possible reasons for dissatisfaction with counsel: the poor quality of court-appointed counsel (which
is a result of budgetary deficiencies and huge caseloads) and ideological
reasons that made these defendants mistrust the court-appointed attorney
(many of the pro se defendants were accused of felonies carrying some
ideological character, such as tax evasion).109
The data also shows that pro se defendants were more likely to go to trial
than represented defendants.110 This finding is used in this research to support the claim that concerns with attorney quality were the reason these litigants chose pro se litigation. At the same time, the correlation between
the choice to go to trial and the choice to proceed pro se might also indicate
that these individuals attribute more importance to voice opportunities.
Are defendants’ concerns about the quality of representation legitimate?
Certainly in some cases they are. It is not hard to find examples and evidence of lawyers, court-appointed and private, who provide their clients
with a less than adequate level of legal services. Lawyers’ negligence in
105. JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O’BARR,
NOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE 35-49 (1990).

RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETH-

106. Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look
at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 429 (2007).
107. Id. at 461 (“[Sixteen percent] of them had made the decision to proceed pro se while
they were represented by an attorney with whom they had publicly expressed dissatisfaction.”).
108. Id. at 465.
109. Id. at 428-30.
110. Id. at 447.
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representation, while almost never recognized as such by the court, certainly has the potential to harm their clients.111 When speaking of courtappointed counsel in criminal cases:
[T]here also is ample evidence that defendants have a basis for being concerned about counsel – the quality of court-appointed counsel is breathtakingly low in many jurisdictions. While all jurisdictions are constitutionally required to provide a lawyer to indigent defendants, many do not
provide good counsel . . . . The deficiencies in the quality of courtappointed counsel result both from a lack of sufficient funding and from
problems in the structure used to provide counsel to indigent defendants.
Public defender systems often work with extremely limited resources. Attorneys are saddled with crushing caseloads and are unable to represent
their clients adequately because of the sheer volume of cases for which
they are responsible.112

It is important to remember these facts when comparing the experiences
of represented and unrepresented litigants, since the quality of the representation is an important factor. The court, for example, says “Our experience
has taught us that ‘a pro se defense is usually a bad defense, particularly
when compared to a defense provided by an experienced criminal defense
attorney.’”113 But what if pro se litigation is compared to representation by
an inexperienced lawyer, or representation by a lawyer whose caseload
does not allow him to devote the minimum required time to the case? Is
representation always better? Or, can we identify a certain level of legal
services which is so poor that it justifies the decision to represent oneself?
D.

Does it Matter if People are Denied Access to a Lawyer?

Not having a lawyer is not the same thing as wanting a lawyer and being
unable to have one for some reason, particularly as a result of cost. The
2005 California study also asked people about the costs of having a lawyer—in particular, residents were asked if the cost of hiring an attorney
kept, or might keep them from going to court. Of those interviewed, 69%
indicated that attorney cost had or might prevent them from going to
court.114 This question combines two issues: whether costs might make it
more difficult to hire an attorney, and whether the lack of an attorney might
make it more difficult to go to court. Likely, there are at least some people

111. RHODE, supra note 16, at 11-14.
112. Hashimoto, supra note 106, at 567-70.
113. Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 161 (2000) (quoting John F. Decker,
The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 483,
487 (1996)) (discussed in Hashimoto, supra note 106, at 446-47).
114. ROTTMAN, supra note 10, at 19-20.
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who feel unable to hire an attorney, but who would be able to go to court
without one.
Does the perception that one can not afford an attorney matter, and consequently, does it matter that one is less able to go to court? In the California study, those who indicated that they might not be able to go to court
due to attorney costs indicated that the courts performed less well (r = .15);
that the courts were less satisfactory institutions (r = .11); that the courts
were less procedurally just (r = .14); and that they had less confidence in
the court system (r = .09). Hence, in this study, thinking that one lacked
access to justice due to prohibitive attorney costs is related to a variety of
negative evaluations of the court system.115
Another group of potential interest is litigants who could afford or otherwise have access to an attorney, but who nevertheless decide to represent
themselves. While studies indicate that there are litigants who choose to
represent themselves even though they can afford to hire a lawyer, there is
no data that distinguishes the experiences of these litigants from those who
represent themselves out of necessity, and at this time we cannot comment
upon how these litigants experience going to court.
CONCLUSION
The experience that litigants have when they deal with the legal system
is important because it shapes their willingness to accept decisions and
their evaluations of the legal system. Extensive psychological literature exists to point to the issues that influence litigants and to the procedural elements that are key to people’s reactions. That literature suggests that
people care about the fairness of the procedures used to deal with the problems that bring them into court. From this procedural justice framework
we argue that structural changes in the legal system, such as the provision
of counsel in civil cases, should be evaluated from the perspective of how
those changes influence the experience of litigants.
Our analysis of the psychology of pro se litigation began with a recognition that having an opportunity to be represented in the litigation process,
often referred to as having voice, is central to people’s subjective reactions
to that experience. If people feel represented, they indicate that the procedure is more neutral, they feel more respect, and they indicate higher levels
of trust in the decision-maker. Further, whether people feel represented in
the litigation shapes their satisfaction, their willingness to accept the decisions made, and their evaluations of law and legal authorities more general115. Id. at 22. The data from this paper has been reanalyzed by the authors of this paper
for the analysis reported. Tyler & Rottman, supra note 34.

TYLER_CHRISTENSEN

3/12/2010 1:57 PM

504

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXVII

ly. Hence, it is important to consider how the form of legal participation
shapes people’s feelings about voice—and in particular, in what way it
matters if people have or do not have a lawyer.
Our review reveals that there is not a great deal of empirical research
addressing questions resulting from access to counsel. Moreover, the existing data presents some contradictory findings. One general impression
from this review is that current research fails to capture and measure the
quality of individuals’ legal experiences. People’s evaluations of legal procedures in which they participated are determined, eventually, by the quality of the legal representation they had or the quality of the treatment they
received from the judge or other court personnel. It is difficult to compare
the experience of a person who had a zealous lawyer with that of a litigant
who had an attorney who provided a less than satisfactory level of representation. It is similarly complicated to compare the experience of these
two litigants with that of a pro se litigant, in order to draw general conclusions about self representation more generally. Future research should aim
to overcome these obstacles in assessing individuals’ legal experiences.
Meanwhile, any conclusions or recommendations regarding the provision
of a lawyer as a means to increased access to justice should take into account the quality of legal representation that could be offered.
There are still, however, several conclusions that can be drawn from
what we know at this time.
A.

The Denial of Access to the Courts

One clear finding is that the feeling of being denied access to the system,
due to lack of financial resources to consult with and retain counsel, clearly
leads to negative feelings about the courts and the law. In addition, the inability to obtain legal representation for financial reasons decreases the
number of people who go to court and, as a consequence, lowers the general level at which legal grievances are represented in court. Provision of
counsel is likely to improve public views of the courts and the law by lessening the number of potential litigants who feel that they are not able to
pursue their claims because they lack the financial resources to do so.
B.

The Psychology of Representation

One of the primary concerns emerging from an examination of the psychological literature on representation is that people might prefer direct
participation. That argument flows from the suggestion that people value
direct interaction with the decision-maker for two reasons: first, because it
allows them to tell their side of the story and present their own evidence;
second, because the attention of authorities provides direct evidence that
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the decision-maker is listening to and considering their arguments. This is
reassuring. It reinforces the belief that authorities are benevolent and, further, are concerned about the problems of ordinary citizens.
In view of these possible benefits associated with direct interaction with
authority figures and voice, the question is whether individuals are less able
to experience that sense of control and less likely to feel listened to if the
communication occurs through an attorney. Based upon the research reviewed, we saw that overall, having or not having an attorney is not generally associated with changes in litigants’ feeling that they have a voice in
the litigation process. Fears that representation by an attorney will undermine the satisfaction associated with directly presenting one’s side of the
case are not supported by currently available evidence. As mentioned before, given the importance of voice this is an important finding. Conversely though, there is no evidence that providing people with an attorney will
increase their feeling of having voice. The potential advantages of having
legal representation are not manifested in enhancing litigants’ satisfaction
with their level of participation and voice. There are, however, other advantages related to legal representation.
In reviewing the currently available literature, we found a number of
anecdotal suggestions about potential consequences of representation by an
attorney. One commonly noted consequence of legal representation is that
people usually feel that they understand the procedures used and the decisions made better if they have a trained and experienced lawyer
representing them. Litigants with lawyers frequently feel that they better
understand the law and legal procedures than do those litigants who
represent themselves. As a consequence, the litigation experience is often
generally a more satisfying experience when people are represented by a
lawyer. It is clear, however, that this is not always the case, and some litigants react positively to the challenges posed by pro se litigation. This
might also not be true of cases where the attorney does not provide clients
with the appropriate information and guidance. Our conclusions regarding
provision of attorney assume adequate level of representation.
Overall, we know that pro se litigants experience a lot of frustration in
court but at the same time we have a large body of evidence showing that
represented litigants can also feel lack of control or involvement with their
own case which leads to frustration as well. There is a need for future research to directly address the different psychological effects of direct and
mediated participation. Additional research is also required in order to determine how the different procedural values are ranked and balanced by individuals. For example, how do people compare voice opportunities (direct
or mediated), control, or understanding of the legal procedures with the security and reassurance provided by a professional? Or, how do individuals
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balance the opportunity to completely control the management of their
case, with the difficulties they face as outsiders in a professional system?
C.

Potential Changes in the Legal System

In considering the benefits and costs of pro se litigation, some aspects of
the legal system need to be mentioned. The first is the quality of legal representation. The impact of the provision of counsel in and of itself is unlikely to have an influence. By retaining counsel, people lose their opportunity to directly represent themselves. Therefore, the quality of their
experience will depend upon the quality of their legal representation, relative to what the litigant might have been able, or at least imagines he might
have been able, to accomplish himself. To improve the quality of legal representation the organized bar needs to support training in lawyering techniques. It is equally important to provide the resources that allow attorneys
the time to be effective advocates for their clients, something that the provision of access to counsel should help to do.
The form of legal procedure is also relevant. Irrespective of whether litigants are provided counsel, it is crucial that their concerns about receiving
a fair process are addressed. As we have noted, the current litigation system does not provide opportunities for involvement and voice once litigants
are represented by counsel. Conversely, while the court system has taken
serious strides to address the pro se phenomenon,116 many traditional court
systems still do too little to aid those litigants who do not have attorneys to
master and navigate the complexity of the courthouse. Further, judges vary
in the degree to which they are willing to aid pro se litigants trying to make
legally relevant arguments in support of their cases. Procedures need to be
modified to correct both of these problems.
As an example of creating opportunities for voice, courts have accommodated victim statements at sentencing hearings. While victims have no
legal standing to speak before those convicted of crimes against them are
sentenced, many jurisdictions provide them with opportunities for voice.
In a similar vein, legal authorities should consider ways that represented
litigants can be given opportunities for voice. One example, already mentioned, is the use of more informal procedures such as mediation. Or,
judges may simply allow represented litigants to have some opportunities
to directly address them, to speak to the jury, and or to participate in discussions about the evidence.

116. See Greacen, supra note 91, at 22 (reviewing extensively the many programs developed in the court system to assist pro se litigants).
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The accommodation of courts to pro se litigation is already ongoing.
The courts have created help desks in courthouses, offices whose function
is to provide legal guidance and to explain court procedures, and translation
services that enable people to more effectively communicate with judges
and other court personnel. These accommodations reflect the simple reality
that pro se litigation is increasing in frequency and must be dealt with in
some way by the courts, in addition to any attempt to increase access to
counsel.

